University of Massachusetts Amherst

Capital Management Techniques
In Developing Countries: An Assessment
of Experiences from the 1990's
and Lessons For the Future

POLITICAL ECONOMY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE

POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Gerald Epstein
Ilene Grabel
Jomo, K.S.
2003
10th floor Thompson Hall
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, MA, 01003-7510
Telephone: (413) 545-6355
Facsimile: (413) 545-2921
Email:peri@econs.umass.edu
Website:
http://www.umass.edu/peri/

WORKINGPAPER SERIES
Number 56

Capital Management Techniques In Developing Countries:
An Assessment of Experiences from the 1990's and Lessons For the Future

Gerald Epstein, Ilene Grabel and Jomo, K.S.
April 2003

This is a revised version of a paper that was presented at the XVIth Technical Group Meeting
(TGM) of the G-24 in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, February 13-14, 2003. Gerald
Epstein is Professor of Economics and Co-Director of the Political Economy Research Institute
(PERI) at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Ilene Grabel is Associate Professor of
International Finance at the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.
Jomo, K.S. is Professor of Economics, University of Malaya. Epstein acknowledges the financial
support of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. In addition, we thank Arjun Jayadev and Peter
Zawadzki for excellent research assistance and Jayadev for his contributions to the India case
study. We are grateful to Robert McCauley and Dani Rodrik for their help at the early stages of
this project We are also grateful to the participants at the TGM for helpful comments (especially,
Ariel Buira, Aziz Ali Mohammed, Esteban Pérez, and Benu Schneider). Send comments to:
Gerald Epstein (gepstein@econs.umass.edu) or Ilene Grabel (igrabel@du.edu).

1

Abstract
This paper uses the term, capital management techniques, to refer to two complementary
(and often overlapping) types of financial policies: policies that govern international private
capital flows and those that enforce prudential management of domestic financial institutions.
The paper shows that regimes of capital management take diverse forms and are multi-faceted.
The paper also shows that capital management techniques can be static or dynamic. Static
management techniques are those that authorities do not modify in response to changes in
circumstances. Capital management techniques can also be dynamic, meaning that they can be
activated or adjusted as circumstances warrant. Three types of circumstances trigger
implementation of management techniques or lead authorities to strengthen or adjust existing
regulations--changes in the economic environment, the identification of vulnerabilities, and the
attempt to close loopholes in existing measures.
The paper presents seven case studies of the diverse capital management techniques
employed in Chile, Colombia, Taiwan Province of China, India, China, Singapore and Malaysia
during the 1990s. The cases reveal that policymakers were able to use capital management
techniques to achieve critical macroeconomic objectives. These included the prevention of
maturity and locational mismatch; attraction of favored forms of foreign investment; reduction in
overall financial fragility, currency risk, and speculative pressures in the economy; insulation
from the contagion effects of financial crises; and enhancement of the autonomy of economic
and social policy. The paper examines the structural factors that contributed to these
achievements, and also weighs the costs associated with these measures against their
macroeconomic benefits.
The paper concludes by considering the general policy lessons of these seven
experiences. The most important of these lessons are as follows. 1.) Capital management
techniques can enhance overall financial and currency stability, buttress the autonomy of macro
and micro-economic policy, and bias investment toward the long-term. 2.) The efficacy of
capital management techniques is highest in the presence of strong macroeconomic
fundamentals, though management techniques can also improve fundamentals. 3.) The nimble,
dynamic application of capital management techniques is an important component of policy
success. 4.) Controls over international capital flows and prudential domestic financial
regulation often function as complementary policy tools, and these tools can be useful to
policymakers over the long run. 5.) State and administrative capacity play important roles in the
success of capital management techniques. 6.) Evidence suggests that the macroeconomic
benefits of capital management techniques probably outweigh their microeconomic costs. 7.)
Capital management techniques work best when they are coherent and consistent with a national
development vision. 8.) There is no single type of capital management technique that works best
for all developing countries. Indeed our cases, demonstrate a rather large array of effective
techniques.
There are sound reasons for cautious optimism regarding the ability of policymakers in
the developing world to build upon these lessons. In particular, we are heartened by the growing
understanding of the problems with capital account convertibility in developing countries; by the
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increasing recognition of the achievements of capital management techniques by important
figures in academia, the IMF and the business community; and by the potential for some
developing countries (such as China, India, Malaysia, Chile, Singapore) to play a lead role in
discussions of the feasibility and efficacy of various capital management techniques.
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I. INTRODUCTION1
Following the Asian crisis of the late 1990's, there has been a renewed interest in the role
of capital controls in developing countries within both policy and academic circles. The reasons
for this interest are not hard to find. Even strong proponents of capital account liberalization have
acknowledged that many countries that avoided the worst effects of recent financial crises were
also those that used capital controls, including China, India, Malaysia and Chile. Consequently,
prominent mainstream economists and even the IMF have relaxed their insistence that immediate
capital account liberalization is the best policy for all countries in all circumstances [IMF, 2000;
Fischer, 2002; Eichengreen, 2002a].2 Adding momentum to the discussion over the last several
years, a number of highly respected economists have actively argued in favor of capital controls
[e.g., Bhagwati, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; Krugman, 1998; Rodrik, 1998].
Despite this apparent increase in the tolerance for capital controls, most mainstream
academic and policy economists remain quite skeptical about the viability and desirability of
controls, at least in two specific senses. Whatever increased tolerance for capital controls exists
applies to controls on inflows, not on outflows. Moreover, controls on inflows are generally seen
as a “temporary evil,” useful only until all of the institutional pre-requisites for full financial and
capital account liberalization are in place.
More generally, there are three principal lines of argument advanced by those who
remain skeptical of capital controls. First, the benefits of capital controls have been overstated or
misunderstood by their proponents [Edwards, 1999, 2001]. Second, capital controls impose
serious costs on developing economies (e.g., they raise capital costs and induce corruption).
Third, capital controls cannot work in today’s liberalized environment because of the likelihood
of evasion.
In this study we show that critics often overstate the costs of capital controls and fail to
acknowledge their numerous important achievements. In fact, our study demonstrates that
capital controls in many developing countries have recently achieved numerous important
objectives. We argue that policymakers in the developing world can and should draw upon these
achievements in their discussions of policy design.
At the outset we emphasize that a thorough understanding of the policy options available
to developing countries necessitates that we expand the discussion of capital controls to include
what we term “capital management techniques.” Capital management techniques include the
traditional menu of capital controls but add a set of policies that we term “prudential financial
regulations.” We argue that certain types of prudential financial regulations actually function as
a type of capital control; moreover, capital controls themselves can function as or complement
prudential financial regulations. Our research demonstrates that there is often a great deal of
synergy between prudential financial regulations and traditional capital controls.
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This paper presents a condensed version of our case studies and arguments. See Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo [2003]
for details.
2
Of course, doctrinaire hold-outs on capital account liberalization still exist. For instance, some members of the US
Treasury took this stance in recent negotiations with Chile and Singapore over free trade agreements (see section V).
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We also find that it can be difficult (and sometimes impossible) to draw a firm line
between prudential domestic financial regulation and capital controls. For instance, domestic
financial regulations that curtail the extent of maturity or locational mismatches may have the
effect of influencing the composition of international capital flows to a country, even those these
types of regulations are commonly classified as prudential domestic financial regulations and not
as capital controls.
The paper presents seven case studies of the diverse capital management techniques
employed during the 1990s. There are eight principal findings that follow from our case studies.
1.) Capital management techniques can enhance overall financial and currency stability, buttress
the autonomy of macro and micro-economic policy, and bias investment toward the long-term.
2.) The efficacy of capital management techniques is highest in the presence of strong
macroeconomic fundamentals, though management techniques can also improve fundamentals.
3.) The nimble, dynamic application of capital management techniques is an important
component of policy success. 4.) Controls over international capital flows and prudential
domestic financial regulation often function as complementary policy tools, and these tools can
be useful to policymakers over the long run. 5.) State and administrative capacity play important
roles in the success of capital management techniques. 6.) The macroeconomic benefits of
capital management techniques outweigh the often scant evidence of their microeconomic costs.
7.) Capital management techniques work best when they are coherent and consistent with a
national development vision. And 8.) there is no single type of capital management technique
that works best for all developing countries. Indeed our cases, demonstrate a rather large array
of effective techniques.
This paper is organized in the following manner. In section II we briefly survey the
literature on capital account liberalization and capital controls. In section III we discuss capital
management techniques in some depth, focusing on types of techniques, achievements and costs.
In section IV we present seven case studies of the capital management techniques employed in
developing countries during the 1990s. In Section V we summarize our chief findings and
discuss broad policy relevance. We also discuss the political prospects for building on our chief
policy lessons.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In recent years, economists have produced an enormous body of empirical literature on
capital controls and capital account convertibility. There is a large literature on the effect of
capital account liberalization on economic and productivity growth, investment, income
distribution and financial crises [e.g., recent surveys appear in Kangkook Lee, 2002;
Eichengreen, 2001; Arteta et. al., 2001]. This research uses primarily cross sectional or panel
techniques, and attempts to assess "broad brush" claims about regimes of capital controls versus
regimes of capital account liberalization. This literature suggests quite clearly that the road to
successful capital account liberalization is rocky at best, and that full capital account
liberalization need not be a goal for all developing countries.
A second strand of the literature looks more specifically at the effects of controls
themselves via cross-sectional econometric analysis [e.g. Epstein and Schor, 1992; Grilli and
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Miles-Ferreti, 1995; Edwards, 1999, 2001] or case studies [e.g. Ariyoshi, et. al. 2000; Kaplan
and Rodrik, 2001; Rajamaran, 2001].3 Several findings emerge from these analyses. Capital
controls can reduce the vulnerability of developing countries to financial crises. Controls over
capital inflows can be effective (at least in the short run) in changing the composition and
maturity structure of flows. Through their effects on composition and maturity structure,
controls on inflows can reduce the vulnerability to crisis [e.g., Montiel and Reinhart, 1999;
references in section IV.B.1]. Capital controls can drive a wedge between onshore and offshore
interest rates. This wedge can provide monetary authorities with limited policy autonomy at
least in the short-run [eg., Dooley, 1996; Crotty and Epstein, 1996].
Despite the emergence of consensus in the areas discussed above, there nevertheless
exists much debate in the academic and policy community as concerns capital controls and
capital account convertibility. The intensive case studies in section IV aim to overcome the
inherent limitations of panel and cross-sectional econometric studies by providing a nuanced,
rigorous analysis of the achievements and limitations of capital management techniques.
III. CAPITAL MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES: TOOLS, OBJECTIVES AND COSTS
A. What are Capital Management Techniques?
We use the term capital management techniques to refer to two complementary (and
often overlapping) types of financial policies: policies that govern international private capital
flows, called “capital controls,” and those that enforce prudential management of domestic
financial institutions. Regimes of capital management take diverse forms and are multi-faceted.
Moreover, some capital management techniques are static while others are dynamic.
1. Complementary policies: Capital controls and prudential financial regulation
Capital controls refer to measures that manage the volume, composition, or allocation of
international private capital flows (see Neely [1999]). Capital controls can target inflows or
outflows. Inflow or outflow controls generally target particular flows (such as portfolio
investment (PI), based on their perceived risks and opportunities. Capital controls can be taxbased or quantitative. Reserve requirement taxes against certain types of investments are an
example of a tax-based control. Quantitative capital controls involve outright bans on certain
investments (e.g., the purchase of equities by foreign investors), restrictions or quotas, or license
requirements.
“Prudential domestic financial regulations” are another type of capital management
technique. These refer to policies, such as capital-adequacy standards, reporting requirements, or
restrictions on the ability and terms under which domestic financial institutions can provide
capital to certain types of projects.
A strict bifurcation between capital controls and prudential regulations often cannot be
maintained in practice (as Ocampo [2002] and Schneider [2001] observe). Policymakers
frequently implement multi-faceted regimes of capital management as no single measure can
3

Recent surveys appear in Dooley [1996], Ariyoshi et. al. [2000], and Edwards [2001].
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achieve diverse objectives (as we will see in section IV). Moreover, the effectiveness of any
single management technique magnifies the effectiveness of other techniques, and enhances the
efficacy of the entire regime of capital management. For example, certain prudential financial
regulations magnify the effectiveness of capital controls (and vice versa). In this case, the
stabilizing aspect of prudential regulation reduces the need for the most stringent form of capital
control. Thus, a program of complementary capital management techniques reduces the
necessary severity of any one technique, and magnifies the effectiveness of the regime of
financial control.
2. Static versus dynamic capital management techniques
Capital management techniques can be static or dynamic (though here, too, the strict
distinction is not always maintained in practice). Static management techniques are those that
authorities do not modify in response to changes in circumstances. Examples of static
management techniques include restrictions on the convertibility of the currency, restrictions on
certain types of activities (such as short-selling the currency), or maintenance of minimum-stay
requirements on foreign investment.
Capital management techniques can also be dynamic, meaning that they can be activated
or adjusted as circumstances warrant. Three types of circumstances trigger implementation of
management techniques or lead authorities to strengthen or adjust existing regulations.
First, capital management techniques are activated in response to changes in the
economic environment (e.g., changes in the volume of international capital flows or the
emergence of an asset bubble).4 For example, the Malaysian government implemented stringent
temporary inflow controls in 1994 to dampen pressures associated with large capital inflows.
The Chilean government changed its capital management techniques several times during the
1990s in response to fluctuations in the volume of capital flows to the country. Second, capital
management techniques are activated to prevent identified vulnerabilities from culminating in a
financial crisis or to reduce the severity of a crisis.5 For example, the Malaysian government
implemented stringent capital controls in 1998 to stabilize the economy and to protect it from the
contagion effects of the regional crisis. Both China and Taiwan POC strengthened existing
capital management techniques and added new measures to insulate themselves from the
emerging regional crisis. Third, capital management techniques are strengthened or modified as
authorities attempt to close loopholes in existing measures. For example, authorities in Taiwan
POC, Chile and China adjusted their capital management techniques several times during the
1990s as loopholes in existing measures were identified.
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Ocampo [2002] proposes dynamic, counter-cyclical domestic financial regulation as a complement to permanent,
adjustable capital controls. Palley [2000] proposes counter-cyclical, variable asset-based reserve requirements.
5
Grabel [1999, 2003a] proposes “trip wires and speed bumps” as a framework for dynamic capital management.
This approach aims to identify the risks to which individual countries are most vulnerable, and to prevent these risks
from culminating in crisis.
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B. Objectives of Capital Management Techniques
Policymakers use capital management techniques to achieve some or all of the following
four objectives—to promote financial stability; to encourage desirable investment and financing
arrangements; to enhance policy autonomy; and to enhance democracy.6
1. Capital management techniques can promote financial stability
Capital management techniques can promote financial stability through their ability to
reduce currency, flight, fragility and/or contagion risks. Capital management can thereby reduce
the potential for financial crisis and attendant economic and social devastation.
Currency risk refers to the risk that a currency will appreciate or depreciate significantly
over a short period of time. Currency risk can be curtailed if capital management techniques
reduce the opportunities for sudden, large purchases or sales of domestic assets by investors (via
controls on inflows and outflows, respectively). Capital management can protect the domestic
currency from dramatic fluctuation via restrictions on its convertibility. Finally, capital
management can provide authorities with the ability to engage in macroeconomic policies that
sterilize the effects of sudden, large capital inflows or outflows on the currency.
Investor flight risk refers to the likelihood that holders of liquid financial assets will sell
their holdings en masse in the face of perceived difficulty. Lender flight risk refers to the
likelihood that lenders will terminate lending programs or will only extend loans on prohibitive
terms. Capital management can reduce investor and lender flight risk by discouraging the types
of inflows that are subject to rapid reversal (namely, PI, short-term foreign loans, and liquid
forms of FDI). Capital management can also reduce investor and lender flight risk by reducing
or discouraging the opportunities for exit via outflow controls.
Fragility risk refers to the vulnerability of an economy’s private and public borrowers to
internal or external shocks that jeopardize their ability to meet current obligations. Fragility risk
arises in a number of ways. Borrowers might employ financing strategies that involve maturity
or locational mismatch. Agents might finance private investment with capital that is prone to
flight risk. Investors (domestic and foreign) may over-invest in certain sectors, thereby creating
overcapacity and fueling unsustainable speculative bubbles. Capital management techniques
can reduce fragility risk through inflow controls that influence the volume, allocation and/or
prudence of lending and investing decisions.
Contagion risk refers to the threat that a country will fall victim to financial and
macroeconomic instability that originates elsewhere. Capital management techniques can reduce
contagion risk by managing the degree of financial integration and by reducing the vulnerability
of individual countries to currency, flight and fragility risks.

6

Discussion of objectives and costs draws on Chang and Grabel [forthcoming: ch.10] and Grabel [2003b];
discussion of the means by which capital management techniques attain their objectives draws on Grabel [2003a].
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2. Capital management techniques can promote desirable types of investment and
financing arrangements and discourage less desirable types of investment/financing strategies
Capital management techniques can influence the composition of the economy’s
aggregate investment portfolio, and can influence the financing arrangements that underpin these
investments. Capital management techniques (particularly those that involve inflow controls)
can promote desirable types of investment and financing strategies by rewarding investors and
borrowers for engaging in them. Desirable types of investment are those that create
employment, improve living standards, promote greater income equality, technology transfer,
learning by doing and/or long-term growth. Desirable types of financing are those that are longterm, stable and sustainable. Capital management can discourage less desirable types of
investment and financing strategies by increasing their cost or precluding them altogether.
3. Capital management can enhance the autonomy of economic and social policy
Capital management techniques can enhance policy autonomy in a number of ways.
Capital management techniques can reduce the severity of currency risk, and can thereby allow
authorities to protect a currency peg. Capital management can create space for the government
and/or the central bank to pursue growth-promoting and/or reflationary macroeconomic policies
by neutralizing the threat of capital flight (via restrictions on capital inflows or outflows).
Moreover, by reducing the risk of financial crisis in the first place, capital management can
reduce the likelihood that governments may be compelled to use contractionary macro- and
micro-economic and social policy as signal to attract foreign investment back to the country or as
a precondition for financial assistance from the IMF. Finally, capital management techniques
can reduce the specter of excessive foreign control or ownership of domestic resources.
4. Capital management techniques can enhance democracy
It follows from point three that capital management can enhance democracy by reducing
the potential for speculators and external actors to exercise undue influence over domestic
decision making directly or indirectly (via the threat of capital flight). Capital management
techniques can reduce the veto power of the financial community and the IMF, and create space
for the interests of other groups (such as advocates for the poor) to play a role in the design of
economic and social policy. Capital management techniques can thus be said to enhance
democracy because they create the opportunity for pluralism in policy design.
C. Costs of Capital Management Techniques
Critics of capital management techniques argue that they impose four types of costs—
they reduce growth; reduce efficiency and policy discipline; promote corruption and waste; and
aggravate credit scarcity, policy abuse, uncertainty and error. Critics argue that the benefits that
derive from capital management (such as financial stability) come at an unacceptably high price.
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1. Capital management techniques reduce growth
Critics of capital management techniques argue that they dampen the volume of
international private capital inflows, and thereby reduce economic growth. Note that some
economists argue that a liberal stance toward international capital flows is only beneficial once a
country reaches a certain threshold level of economic and financial development [e.g., Edwards,
2001]. Advocates of sequencing liberalization generally find their case strengthened following
financial crises, as these are seen as a consequence of premature financial liberalization.
However, the case for sequencing is controversial within neoclassical theory because some argue
that it introduces problems (such as corruption, inertia in reform, slow growth, high capital costs)
that are far worse than any financial instability associated with the liberalization of financial
flows.
Critics of capital management techniques also argue that they raise capital costs, and
thereby undermine investment and growth.7 The argument is that the rate of return necessary to
attract international capital flows will increase since investors demand a premium in order to
commit funds to an economy wherein liquidity or exit options are compromised.8
2. Capital management techniques reduce efficiency and policy discipline
Many critics of capital management techniques argue that they undermine efficiency and
policy discipline. The need to attract international private capital flows and the threat of capital
flight (by domestic and/or foreign investors) are powerful incentives for the government and
firms to maintain international standards for policy design, macroeconomic performance and
corporate governance. For example, governments that seek to attract international private capital
flows will be more likely to pursue anti-inflationary economic policies and anti-corruption
measures because investors value price stability and transparency.9
Moreover, the liberalisation of international capital flows means that these flows will be
allocated by markets rather than by governments. Most critics of capital management assume
that a market-based allocation of capital increases efficiency and ensures that finance will be
directed towards those projects that promise the greatest net contribution to social welfare.
3. Capital management techniques promote corruption and waste
Critics argue that capital management techniques necessitate the creation of elaborate and
expensive bureaucracies. Additionally, critics argue that capital management techniques
stimulate corruption and other wasteful activities as agents seek to evade restrictions through offshore or disguised transactions, trade misinvoicing, lobbying efforts and the bribery of
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Miller [1999] applies the capital cost argument to Malaysia.
However, there is no strong evidence that growth is reduced by capital management techniques [Rodrik 1998;
Eichengreen, 2002].
9
However, during the Latin American and Asian crises of the 1990s large amounts of capital went to countries with
fundamentals that critics found wanting after the crisis ensued. Thus, the "disciplinary" role of international capital
flows seems far less significant than some economists assume.
8
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officials.10 Critics argue that these evasion efforts ultimately frustrate regimes of capital
management.
4. Dynamic capital management techniques aggravate problems of credit scarcity and
policy abuse, uncertainty and error
Critics argue that dynamic capital management techniques have the potential to introduce
or aggravate several problems of their own. Though he is by no means a critic of dynamic
capital management, Ocampo [2002] acknowledges that some capital management techniques
have the potential to harm small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries.
This may occur if dynamic capital management force domestic lenders to raise lending costs
during an economic boom. Higher domestic capital costs may have a disproportionate effect on
SMEs because they tend to raise their funds on domestic capital markets.
Ocampo [2002] also notes that dynamic capital management techniques can introduce
concerns about the abuse of discretionary authority by domestic policymakers. There are also
inherent technical difficulties involved in distinguishing between cyclical and long-run trends.
Investor confidence may suffer if the criteria used for activation of dynamic capital management
techniques are not consistent and transparent.
In sum, many critics argue that there are significant costs associated with capital
management techniques. However, there is little consensus in the empirical literature on the size
(or even the existence) of these costs. More importantly, researchers have largely failed to
investigate the relative weight of costs and benefits. The seven case studies presented below
address these important lacunae.
IV. CASE STUDIES: CAPITAL MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES SINCE THE 1990s
A. Objectives and Case Selection
In this section of the paper we present seven case studies that analyze the capital
management techniques employed during the 1990s in Chile, China, Colombia, India, Malaysia,
Singapore and Taiwan Province of China (POC). The presentation of the case studies is guided
by five principal goals. First, to provide a detailed institutional guide to the capital management
techniques pursued in diverse areas of the world from the 1990s to the present. Second, to
examine the extent to which these management techniques achieved the objectives of their
architects. Third, to elaborate the underlying structural factors that explain the success or failure
of the techniques employed. Fourth, to examine the costs associated with these measures. And
fifth, to draw general conclusions about the desirability and feasibility of replicating or adapting
particular techniques to developing countries outside of our sample.
We have limited our examination to the 1990s because this period is distinguished by the
combination of high levels of financial integration, a global norm of financial and economic
10

A strong version of this view is captured in “Goodhart’s law.” It states that “financial regulations that seek to raise
the costs of certain kinds of financial activity tend to be circumvented over time” [appears in Wilson, 2000:275].
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liberalization, an increase in the power and autonomy of the global financial community, and by
significant advances in telecommunications technology. It is commonly held that any one of
these factors (let alone their combined presence) frustrates the possibility for successful capital
management. We have selected these seven cases because policymakers employed diverse
capital management techniques (in line with levels of state capacity and sovereignty) with
different objectives and disparate degrees of success.
B. Case Studies
Each case study will include the following seven components. (1) The context in which
authorities decided to implement capital management techniques (i.e., historical considerations,
past problems, etc.); (2) objectives of policy architects; (3) description of the capital management
techniques employed; (4) assessment of the extent to which they achieved the objectives of their
architects; (5) consideration of the structural factors that contributed to policy success or failure;
(6) costs or unintended consequences of capital management; and (7) discussion of any
unintended achievements of the policies. Table 1 presents a summary of the major capital
management techniques and their objectives for each of our cases.
1. The ‘Chilean model’ of the 1990s: Capital management techniques in Chile and
Colombia11
In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, heterodox and even prominent mainstream
economists [e.g., Eichengreen, 1999] focused a great deal of attention on the ‘Chilean model,’ a
term that has been used to refer to a policy regime that Chilean and Colombian authorities began
to implement in June 1991 and September 1993, respectively.
Context in Chile and Colombia
During the 1990s, policymakers in Chile and Colombia sought to improve investor
confidence and to promote stable, sustainable economic and export growth. The capital
management techniques of the 1990s were an integral component of the overall economic plan in
both countries. Capital management techniques in Chile and Colombia can perhaps be best
understood in the context of the economic challenges that confronted the region’s economies
during the 1970s and 1980s. These problems included high inflation, severe currency and
banking instability, financial crises, high levels of external debt and capital flight, and low levels
of investor confidence.
Chilean context
Chile experienced a “boom-bust cycle” in the two decades that preceded the capital
management techniques of the 1990s. During the neo-liberal experiment of the 1970s, surges in
foreign capital inflows led to a consumption boom and created significant pressure for currency
appreciation. Experience with the “Dutch disease” in the 1970s reinforced policymaker’s
commitment to preventing the fallout from surges in private capital inflows in the 1990s. The
financial implosion, reduction in international capital flows, and the deep recession of the early
11

This case study draws heavily on Grabel [2003a]. Details and assessment of Chilean and Colombian capital
management techniques are drawn from Agonsin [1998], Eichengreen [1999], Ffrench-Davis and Reisen [1998],
LeFort and Budenvich [1997], Ocampo [2002] and Palma [2000].

12

to mid-1980s also played a powerful role in the design of capital management techniques in the
1990s. Thus, the experiences of the 1970s and 1980s created a consensus around the idea that it
was necessary to insulate the economy from volatile international capital flows.
Preventing the Dutch disease was of paramount importance in the 1990s because of the
government’s commitment to an export-led economic model. Chilean economic policy in the
1990s is difficult to characterize. In some senses, it was rather strongly neo-liberal. For instance,
the country’s status as a pioneer in the area of pension fund privatization earned it much respect
in the international investment community. The government also pursued a vigorous program of
trade liberalization and privatization of state-owned enterprises. But at the same time, the
government also provided education and income support to the poor and unemployed and
maintained a stringent regime of capital management techniques. It should also be noted that the
health of the country’s banking system improved significantly during the 1990s, thanks to a
number of prudential banking and regulatory reforms.
Colombian context
As in Chile, the architects of Colombia’s capital management techniques in the 1990s
were influenced by the economic problems of the previous two decades. The promotion of
investor confidence was a far more daunting task in Colombia than in Chile because of the
country’s political and civil uncertainties. Inflation was also a severe problem in Colombia in
the 1970s and 1980s (and indeed, remained a problem during the 1990s as well). The 1990s was
a time of far-reaching economic reform in Colombia. Authorities sought to attract international
capital flows and promote trade and price stability through a number of structural reforms.
These reforms included trade liberalization, increased exchange rate flexibility, tax reductions,
labor market liberalization, partial privatization of social security and state-owned enterprises,
and central bank independence. Most of the economic reforms in the 1990s were in the direction
of neo-liberalism; however, the capital management techniques and the increases in public
expenditure were important exceptions in this regard.
Objectives
Though there were national differences in policy design, Chilean and Colombian policies
shared the same objectives. The policy regime sought to balance the challenges and opportunities
of financial integration, lengthen the maturity structure and stabilize capital inflows, mitigate the
effect of large volumes of inflows on the currency and exports, and protect the economy from the
instability associated with speculative excess and the sudden withdrawal of external finance.
Capital management techniques in Chile, 1991-9
Financial integration in Chile was regulated through a number of complementary,
dynamic measures (the most important of which are described here). During the lifetime of the
Chilean model, authorities widened and revalued the crawling exchange rate band that was
initially adopted in the early 1980s. The monetary effects of the rapid accumulation of
international reserves were also largely sterilized.
Central to the success of the Chilean model was a multi-faceted program of inflows
management. Foreign loans faced a tax of 1.2 per cent per year. FDI and PI faced a one-year
residence requirement. And from May 1992 to October 1998, Chilean authorities imposed a non-
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interest bearing reserve requirement of 30 per cent on all types of external credits and all foreign
financial investments in the country. Note that the level and scope of the reserve requirement
ratio was, in fact, changed several times during the lifespan of this policy regime in response to
changes in the economic environment and to identified channels of evasion. The required
reserves were held at the Central Bank for one year, regardless of the maturity of the obligation.
The Central Bank eliminated the management of inflows (and other controls over
international capital flows) in several steps beginning in September 1998. This decision was
taken because the country confronted a radical reduction in inflows in the postAsian/Russian/Brazilian crisis environment (rendering flight risk not immediately relevant).
Chilean authorities determined that the attraction of international private capital flows was a
regrettable necessity in light of declining copper prices and a rising current account deficit.
Critics of the Chilean model heralded its demise as proof of its failure.
But others viewed the dismantling of the model as evidence of its success insofar as the
economy had outgrown the need for protections. For example, Eichengreen [1999:53] notes that
by the summer of 1998 it was no longer necessary to provide disincentives to foreign funding
because the Chilean banking system was on such strong footing following a number of
improvements in bank regulation.12 In our view, the decision to terminate inflow and other
controls over international capital flows was imprudent given the substantial risks of a future
surge in capital inflows to the country and the risk that the country could experience contagion
from financial instability in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. It would have been far
more desirable to maintain the controls at a low level while addressing the current account deficit
and the need to attract inflows through other means. Indeed, flexible deployment of the inflows
policy was a hallmark of the Chilean model (consistent with the dynamic approach to capital
management in section III.A), and it is regrettable that authorities moved away from this strategy
at the present juncture.
Capital management techniques in Colombia, 1993-9
Colombia’s inflows management policies relating to foreign borrowing were similar to
(though blunter than) those in Chile. This difference is perhaps attributable to limitations on
state capacity in Colombia. Beginning in September 1993, the Central Bank required that noninterest bearing reserves of 47 per cent be held for one year against foreign loans with maturities
of eighteen months or less (this was extended to loans with a maturity of up to five years in
August 1994). Foreign borrowing related to real estate was prohibited. Moreover, foreigners
were simply precluded from purchasing debt instruments and corporate equity (there were no
comparable restrictions on FDI). Colombian policy also sought to discourage the accretion of
external obligations in the form of import payments by increasing the cost of import financing.
Authorities experimented with a variety of measures to protect exports from currency
appreciation induced by inflows. These measures ranged from a limited sterilization of inflows,
to maintenance of a managed float, to a crawling peg. As in Chile, regulations on international
capital flows were gradually eliminated following the reduction in flows after the Asian crisis.
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Nevertheless Eichengreen [1999] makes clear that authorities erred in terminating inflows management.
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Assessment
The array of capital management techniques that constitute the Chilean model represent a
highly effective means for achieving the economic objectives identified by the architects of these
policies. The capital management techniques achieved these objectives via their effect on
currency, flight, fragility and contagion risks.
Chilean authorities managed currency risk via adjustments to its crawling peg,
sterilization and inflows management. Taken together, these measures greatly reduced the
likelihood that the currency would appreciate to such a degree as to jeopardize the current
account, and the policies made it difficult for investor flight to induce a currency collapse.
Indeed, the appreciation of the Chilean currency and the current account deficit (as a share of
GDP) were smaller than in other Latin American countries that were also recipients of large
capital inflows [Agonsin, 1998]. Moreover, the currency never came under attack following the
Mexican and Asian crises.
Colombian efforts to manage currency risk were less successful than those in Chile. This
is the case for three reasons. There was a lack of consistency in the exchange rate regime in
Colombia as a consequence of the frequent changes in the exchange rate strategy employed
(managed float, crawling peg, etc.) Inflow sterilization was rather limited in scope when
compared to sterilization in Chile. And inflation continued to be a problem in Colombia during
the 1990s. Nonetheless, currency and inflows management offered some protection to exports in
Colombia when the country was receiving relatively large capital inflows. The currency also
held up fairly well following the Mexican crisis.
Chilean and Colombian policies reduced the likelihood of a sudden exit of foreign
investors by discouraging those inflows that introduce the highest degree of flight risk. The
reserve requirement tax in Chile was designed to discourage such flows by raising the cost of
these investments. The Chilean minimum stay policy governing FDI reinforced the strategy of
encouraging longer-term investments while also preventing short-term flows disguised as FDI.
Colombian policy precluded the possibility of an exit of foreign investors from liquid investment
by prohibiting their participation in debt and equity markets (while maintaining their access to
FDI). The reduction in flight risk in both countries complemented efforts to reduce currency risk,
particularly in Chile where policy effectively targeted currency risk.
Chilean and Colombian inflows management also mitigated fragility risk. The regime
reduced the opportunity for maturity mismatch by demonstrating an effective bias against shortterm, unstable capital inflows. In Chile, taxes on foreign borrowing were designed precisely to
discourage the financing strategies that introduced so much fragility risk to Asian economies and
Mexico. In Colombia, the rather large reserve requirement tax on foreign borrowing and the
prohibition on foreign borrowing for real estate played this role as well.
Numerous empirical studies find that inflows management in Chile and Colombia played
a constructive role in changing the composition and maturity structure (though not the volume)
of net capital inflows, particularly after the controls were strengthened in 1994-5 [e.g., FfrenchDavis and Reisen, 1998; LeFort and Budenvich, 1997; Ocampo and Tovar, 1998; Palma, 2000].
These studies also find that leakages from these regulations had no macroeconomic significance.
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Following implementation of these policies in both countries, the maturity structure of foreign
debt lengthened and external financing in general moved from debt to FDI. Moreover, Chile
received a larger supply of external finance (relative to GDP) than other countries in the region,
and FDI became a much larger proportion of inflows than in many other developing economies.
Colombia’s prohibition on foreign equity and bond market participation dramatically reduced the
relative importance of short-term, liquid forms of finance. More strikingly, FDI became a major
source of finance in the country despite political turbulence and blunt financial controls.
The move toward FDI and away from short-term, highly liquid debt and PI flows is a
clear achievement of the Chilean model. However, it is important to note that FDI is not without
its problems. It can and has introduced sovereignty risk in some important cases (such as Chile’s
earlier experience with ITT) and can introduce other problems to developing countries [see
Chang and Grabel, forthcoming: ch. 10; Singh, 2002].
The Chilean model also reduced the vulnerability to contagion by fostering
macroeconomic stability. It is noteworthy that the transmission effects of the Asian crisis in
Chile and Colombia were quite mild compared to those in other Latin countries (such as Brazil),
let alone elsewhere. The decline in capital flows in Chile and Colombia following the Mexican
and Asian crises was rather orderly, and did not trigger currency, asset and investment collapse.
Contra the experience in East Asia, the decision to float the currency in Chile and Colombia (in
the post-Asian crisis environment) did not induce instability.
Some analysts challenge the generally sanguine assessment of the Chilean model.
Edwards [1999], for example, argues that the effectiveness of the model has been exaggerated.
However, in a paper published a year later, De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés [2000] conclude
that Chilean controls affected the composition and maturity of inflows, though not their volume.
The De Gregorio et al. [2000] result is confirmed for Chile in other studies that claim to
demonstrate the failure of the model, even though their reported results show just the opposite
[Ariyoshi et al., 2000; Valdés-Prieto and Soto, 1998]. As Eichengreen aptly remarks, the controls
affected only the composition and maturity and not the volume of inflows is “hardly a
devastating critique” [1999:53], since this was precisely their purpose.
Supporting factors
Capital management techniques in both Chile and Colombia were able to achieve the
economic objectives of their architects for several reasons. The policies were well designed,
consistent and reasonably transparent throughout their life. Policymakers in both countries were
“nimble” in the sense that they dynamically modified capital management techniques as the
economic environment changed13 and as loopholes in the policies were revealed (see Massad
[1998:44] for discussion of the Chilean case).14 Both countries offered investors attractive
opportunities and growing markets, such that investors were willing to commit funds despite the
constraints imposed by the capital management regime.
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E.g., Chile’s reserve requirement was adjusted several times because of changes in the volume of capital flows.
Ocampo [2002:7] points out that the frequency with which authorities changed the rules pertaining to exchange
rates in Chile and reserve requirements in Colombia were not without cost, however.
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Chile certainly had advantages over Colombia. The greater degree of state capacity in
Chile may well explain why its policies (particularly in regards to exchange rate management)
were more successful. Moreover, Chile’s status as a large developing economy certainly
rendered it more attractive to foreign investors, and may have granted the country a greater
degree of policy autonomy than was available to Colombia. The general soundness of its
banking system and macroeconomic policy, the maintenance of price stability and the high level
of official reserves were important sources of investor confidence in Chile. Finally, international
support for the neo-liberal aspects of Chile’s economic reforms provided the government with
the political space to experiment with capital management techniques.
Costs
At this point, compelling evidence on the costs of capital management techniques in
Chile and Colombia is not available. Indeed, the two most comprehensive studies of this issue
deal only with Chile (and in an unsatisfactory manner).
Forbes [2002] is the most extensive study available on the micro-economic costs of
Chilean capital management techniques. Using a variety of empirical tests (and sensitivity
analysis thereof), Forbes shows that capital management techniques in Chile resulted in an
increase in capital costs to small-sized enterprises.15 Forbes is careful to note that the results
themselves must be treated cautiously because of limitations on data availability.
In a broad study of the macro-economic effects of the Chilean capital management
techniques, Edwards [1999] notes in passing that capital management techniques increased
capital costs for the SMEs that had difficulty evading controls on capital inflows. He reports that
the cost of funds to smaller enterprises in Chile was more than 21% and 19% per year in dollar
terms in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Edwards does not, however, place these data into the
necessary comparative context, rendering them entirely unpersuasive as an indictment of the
Chilean capital management techniques.
Both Forbes and Edwards conclude their studies with the argument that the cost to
smaller firms of Chilean capital management techniques is far from a trivial mater because these
enterprises play an important role in investment, growth, and employment creation in developing
countries. Neither study provides empirical support for the argument that these firms do, in fact,
play a significant role in macro-economic performance. And neither study provides
unambiguous evidence that the macro-economic benefits of Chilean capital management
techniques fail to outweigh even the modest evidence of their microeconomic costs (and much
the same could be said of Colombian experience).
On the issue of costs versus benefits, it should be noted that Forbes [2002] remains
agnostic on the relative importance of micro-economic costs versus macro-economic benefits.
Edwards [1999], by contrast, is entirely clear on this matter. He argues that proponents of
Chilean capital management techniques vastly overstate their macroeconomic benefits and fail to
acknowledge their microeconomic costs. On this basis, he argues that the Chilean capital
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management techniques should not serve as a model for other developing countries. We find the
empirical basis for this conclusion entirely unconvincing.
Other achievements
As discussed above, the capital management techniques associated with the Chilean
model achieved the most important goals of its architects (though to a greater extent in Chile
than in Colombia). Additionally, the capital management techniques in both countries can be
credited with enhancing the sovereignty of macro- and micro-economic and social policy. The
importance of this achievement warrants discussion.
The capital management techniques of the Chilean model afforded policymakers
insulation from potential challenges to macro- and micro-economic and social policy sovereignty
through the reduction in various types of risks (particularly, through reduction in flight and
fragility risks). Both countries were able to maintain relatively autonomous, somewhat
restrictive monetary policies because of the protections afforded by the capital management
techniques [LeFort and Budenvich, 1997].16 Moreover, the protection from flight risk afforded
by the capital management techniques made it possible for policymakers to implement some
growth-oriented fiscal policies [LeFort and Budenvich, 1997]. Finally, as LeFort and Budenvich
[1997] argue, the protections and advantages conferred on both countries by their capital
management techniques were essential to the success of the entire regime of macro- and microeconomic policy.17 For instance, the attraction of certain types of international capital flows
promoted economic growth in both countries, and the protection from currency appreciation (to a
large extent in Chile, and to a modest extent in Colombia) contributed to success in currentaccount performance.
The insulation afforded to both countries by the capital management techniques also
meant that monetary authorities were able to navigate the transition to a floating exchange rate
far more smoothly. In many other countries (such as in East Asia), the transition to a floating
rate involved significant currency depreciations and financial instability.
The capital management techniques employed in both countries also reduced the risk of
financial crisis, and thereby buttressed the sovereignty of economic and social policies in both
countries. Capital management techniques reduced the potential for IMF involvement in both
countries. Policymakers were therefore never pressed to change the direction of (macro- or
micro-) economic or social policy to satisfy the demands of the IMF or to calm investors.
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Even Edwards [1999:77], a prominent critic of capital management techniques in Chile, shows that they increased
the autonomy of monetary policy in the country. However, he argues the extent of increased autonomy was trivial
insofar as the small benefit accruing from increased monetary policy autonomy was outweighed by the increase in
capital costs that were associated with the capital management techniques.
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Though note that capital management techniques and macroeconomic policy did not succeed in promoting price
stability in Colombia [LeFort and Budenvich, 1997].
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2. Taiwan Province of China (POC)
Context
The capital management techniques employed in Taiwan POC can only be understood in
the context of a “developmentalist state” and an extended notion of national security that
includes economic and financial stability.18 That is, capital management techniques are an
integral component of the macroeconomic and security objectives of Taiwan POC (see below for
discussion of objectives). These economic and security objectives were and largely still are the
guiding forces behind extensive regulation of domestic financial institutions and credit flows,
monetary and exchange rate policy and controls over international capital flows. Taiwan POC
built its industrial base on the basis of restrictive policies toward FDI in “strategic sectors” [for
details, see Chang and Grabel, forthcoming]. Capital management techniques played a critical
role in promoting industrialization and export performance.
Objectives
Prior to the mid-1980s, Taiwan POC’s policymakers employed a multi-faceted set of
capital management techniques in the service of three aims: to promote industrialization and
export supremacy, economic growth, and economic stability. Since the goal of industrialization
had been achieved by the mid-1980s, capital management techniques are directed towards
growth and stability objectives. Capital management techniques that restrict investment in
unproductive assets are critical in this regard.
Extensive capital management techniques are still in use, though policymakers began to
liberalize aspects of the financial sector and to loosen some controls over international capital
flows in 1995 as part of the Asia Pacific Regional Operations Center Plan (APROC) and the goal
of joining the WTO. The APROC aimed at making Taiwan POC a regional center for high
value-added manufacturing, transportation, finance, telecommunications, and several other areas.
However, as Chin and Nordhaug [2002:82] make clear, financial liberalization in Taiwan POC in
the 1990s in no way weakened prudential financial regulation in the country.
Capital management techniques in Taiwan POC
As discussed above, Taiwan POC maintains an extensive set of capital management
techniques that are tied to economic and security objectives.19
Policymakers maintain rather tight reins on the domestic currency, the New Taiwan
dollar (NT dollar), and on currency risk more generally. Most important among the capital
management techniques that relate to currency risk is the lack of convertibility of the NT dollar.
There are a number of other ways that the Central Bank of China (the CBC) manages the NT
dollar. Prior to September1994, foreign nationals (without residency visas) were prohibited from
opening NT dollar accounts. But as of September 1994, the CBC has permitted non-resident
foreign nationals and corporations to hold savings accounts denominated in NT dollars, although
18

See Chin and Nordhaug [2002] on the extended notion of security in Taiwan POC and, more generally, for a rich
discussion of the broader context of its economic and financial policies.
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The description of capital management techniques draws heavily on Chin and Nordhaug [2002]. Details are also
drawn from the EIU [2002] and the US Commercial Service [2002].
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the use of these is limited to domestic spending or to the purchase of imports. These accounts
may not be used to purchase foreign exchange or for securities trading. The CBC also adjusts
the reserve ratios that must be held against foreign currency deposits in order to prevent inflows
of foreign investment from leading to an appreciation of the NT dollar.
The domestic banking system is highly regulated by the state. Indeed, domestic banks in
Taiwan POC were primarily owned by the state until the early 1990s. In 1995 71.9 per cent of
Taiwan POC ’s total banking assets were housed in banks that were controlled fully or partly by
the government; in the same year, 62.2 per cent of overall credit was provided by governmentcontrolled credit and financial institutions [Chin and Nordhaug, 2002:81]. Authorities maintain
restrictions on bank participation in speculative activities. Bank involvement in securities
holdings is limited. In 1989, the Central Bank imposed a 20% ceiling on bank lending to the real
estate sector for six year following problems associated with a real estate bubble in the 1980s
[Chin and Nordhaug, 2002].
Authorities also regulate foreign borrowing. Foreign-owned companies must apply to the
CBC and the Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to secure government
approval for borrowing from abroad. Control over foreign borrowing aims to concentrate most
private foreign borrowing from international banks in Taiwan POC ’s banks rather than in the
hands of individuals. In fact, at the end of June 1997, 62% of all private foreign borrowing in the
country went to its banks [Chin and Nordhaug, 2002:93].
Foreign investment in Taiwan POC remains tightly regulated. During the 1990s certain
strategic sectors were off-limits to foreign investors. These restrictions have been loosened
considerably beginning in March 1996. However, authorities retain the ability to manage foreign
investment: at present what are termed “qualified foreign institutional investors” are subject to a
ceiling on maximum investment; foreign individual investors are also subject to a ceiling on
maximum investment and must receive approval from the CBC.
The stock market and PI are closely regulated as well. Chin and Nordhaug [2002:89]
point out that Taiwan POC ’s stock bubble in the 1980s exposed some regulatory weaknesses,
leading authorities to improve the quality of capital market regulation and to increase control
over PI inflows. They also note that a number of events in the 1990s reinforced the CBCs
regulatory caution toward the stock market and PI inflows. These events also encouraged the
CBC to develop new strategies for discouraging speculation and channeling capital toward
developmentally productive uses. The CBCs power to regulate the stock market and PI inflows
increased following the country’s stock market crash in 1990, and following its interventions to
support the currency and the stock market in the aftermath of the cross-strait tensions and the
ensuing missile crisis from August 1995-March 1996. The CBC also monitored evasion of its
regulations and had the political will to enforce penalties when malfeasance was uncovered. For
example, in 1995 the CBC closed Taiwan POC ’s foreign exchange market for one year when it
was discovered that a major share of the foreign inflows that it had approved for equity
investment had been used to speculate against the currency [Chin and Nordhaug, 2002:88].
During the Asian financial crisis, Taiwan POC’s authorities also took steps to prevent illegal
trading of funds by financier George Soros (because these funds were blamed for causing the
stock market to fall).
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Taiwan POC ’s stock market was not very “internationalized” during the 1990s as a
direct result of its policies toward PI. In 1997, foreign investors held only 4 per cent of stocks on
the domestic exchange [Chin and Nordhaug, 2002:94]. Moreover, authorities maintained firm
entry and exit barriers and high withholding taxes on dividends (in 1996 the tax rate on dividends
was 35%) [Chin and Nordhaug, 2002:87]. Today, buying stocks on margin and short-selling are
still prohibited.
Assessment
It is clear that Taiwan POC ’s capital management techniques have achieved the
objectives of its architects. The regime of capital management clearly plays an essential role in
Taiwan POC’s industrialization, export performance, economic growth and economic and
financial stability. The strategic stance toward FDI was critical to industrialization.
Capital management techniques are central to Taiwan POC ’s financial stability. The
restrictions on currency convertibility mean that it is difficult for Taiwan POC to experience a
currency collapse (and related currency-induced fragility risk). Investors have little reason to
fear a collapse of currency values, and they behave accordingly (as was evident during the
regional crisis of 1997-8). Thus, even a decline in asset values (e.g., stocks) is unlikely to
translate into a currency crash.
Taiwan POC ’s exposure to currency, fragility and flight risks is reduced by the
restrictions on foreign investors’ ability to use the currency for speculation. The regulation of
the stock market (e.g., prohibitions on buying on margin and short-selling) and the cautious
stance toward PI curtail the fragility and flight risks to which Taiwan POC is exposed. It is
notable that regulatory authorities have responded to the evasion of financial controls and the
appearance of regulatory gaps by dynamically refashioning their capital management techniques.
The regulations that govern banks and foreign lending support the objective of promoting
financial and economic stability. Banks in Taiwan POC do not have a high exposure to
securities and real estate transactions. As a consequence, banks do not hold a large portfolio of
non-performing or under-collateralized loans. Curbs on foreign lending also reduce fragility in
the economy and render the risk of lender flight not terribly important.
Taiwan POC ’s resilience during the Asian financial crisis is no small part due to the
economic and financial stability fostered by its capital management techniques. It was simply
not vulnerable to the currency, flight, or fragility risks that proved so devastating to many
countries in the region.
Supporting factors
The achievements of Taiwan POC ’s capital management techniques were facilitated by a
number of structural and geopolitical factors.20 Critical among these are the high degree of
regulatory capacity and the independence of the CBC from political bodies. This independence
allowed the CBC to exercise its authority to curb speculation, close loopholes in policy, and to
20
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resist international and external pressures to liberalize the financial system imprudently. The
policy independence of the CBC stemmed from its Presidential backing and the government’s
historic commitment to financial stability. National security concerns and geopolitical
uncertainties reinforced the commitment to financial stability, as stability is seen as essential to
the task of withstanding diplomatic, military, and/or economic shocks. The reaction of the CBC
to several events in the 1990s “served as an unplanned rehearsal for the subsequent 1997-98
regional financial crisis” [Chin and Nordhaug, 2002:91].
As part of its national development vision, the Taiwan POC channeled rents to promote
exports and upgrade industry. These efforts were accompanied by strict performance criteria and
disciplinary measures. In this context, stringent and dynamic capital management techniques
were essential to the promotion of productive investment and industrial dynamism.
Costs
There is scant evidence available on the costs of Taiwan POC’s capital management
techniques. A report by the for International Economics [1998], for instance, reports that capital
management techniques in Taiwan POC have created a concentration of credit in large firms and
an illiquid financial system, have provided incentives for a rather large informal financial sector
to flourish, and have reinforced conservatism on the part of its banks. Chin and Nordhaug
[2002:83] report that this conservatism leads banks to favor short-term lending backed by
tangible collateral, such as real estate. This study also reports that banks are limited in their
ability to engage in project, company and credit assessments, and do not have reliable accounting
and auditing systems.
Clearly, the evidence on costs reviewed here is limited and anecdotal. Even if one were
to accept this evidence fully, these costs in no way outweigh the macroeconomic benefits
afforded to Taiwan POC by its capital management techniques.
Other achievements
Capital management techniques afforded Taiwan POC insulation from the Asian
financial crisis. This insulation from crisis, coupled with China’s vast resources, meant that
Taiwan POC did not confront challenges to the sovereignty of macro- and microeconomic and
social policy associated with IMF involvement or with the need to regain investor confidence.
3. Singapore21
Singapore is widely believed to have a completely free and open capital account, a "fact"
that is often cited as an essential component of Singapore's outward-oriented economic policy
and its rapid post-war economic growth.22 It is true that Singapore eliminated its exchange
controls in 1978, and since that time, both residents and non-residents have been free to engage
in a broad range of international financial market activities. However, it less well known that the
“Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has a long-standing policy of not encouraging the
internationalization of the Singapore Dollar (S$)" [MAS, 2002:1]. The S$ "non21
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internationalization policy" limits the borrowing of S$ by residents and non-residents for
"currency speculation" [MAS, 2002: 13. fn 9]. This policy is clearly a type of capital
management technique, and evidently has been successful in the sense of contributing to
Singapore’s macroeconomic and industrial policy and economic stability.
Context
By virtually any measure, Singapore's economy has been a major success story of postwar economic development. To just cite one statistic, the per capita income in Singapore has
more than quadrupled in less than twenty years, growing from US$5,200 in 1981 to US$23,000
in 1999. Moreover, Singapore’s economy has been relatively stable for the last twenty years,
notably escaping the worst ravages of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990's. [See MAS,
2001]. The government of Singapore has used a creative mix of macroeconomic tools and other
government policies to achieve these outcomes. Macroeconomic policy has been rather
conservative in a number of ways. The government has sought to maintain fiscal surpluses and
low rates of inflation and has sought to attract large amounts of foreign direct investment. Few
would deny the success of these policies. To take just one example, between 1981 and 1999,
Singapore attracted FDI in an amount of over 9% of its GDP, far higher than any of its neighbors
[MAS, 2001, p. 11].
At the same time, the government of Singapore has projected an image of greater
adherence to economic orthodoxy than is actually the case. For example, Singapore has pursued
a very successful industrial policy, huge infrastructure investments and large investment in
public housing for its population, all of which have contributed to a rapid growth of living
standards. Most important for our purposes, the government has pursued a managed exchange
rate policy designed to stabilize the exchange rate and maintain the competitiveness of
Singapore's industry. It turns out that Singapore's capital management techniques have played an
important, but little understood role, in many of these successful polices.23
Objectives
According to the MAS, the aim of the policy of non-internationalization of the S$ "is to
prevent the exchange rate from being de-stabilized and to ensure the effective conduct of our
monetary policy" (ibid.) The policy is also designed to help Singapore maintain the "soft peg"
that has been crucial for its export-led strategy of development. Singapore’s successful
maintenance of its soft peg defies the conventional wisdom that soft-pegs are not viable
[Eichengreen, 1999].
Capital management techniques in Singapore
Singapore progressively dismantled exchange controls in the 1970's until virtually all
restrictions were removed in 1978. In 1981, the MAS moved to an exchange rate-centered
23

Since 1981, monetary policy in Singapore has been centered on exchange rate management. First, the exchange
rate is managed against a basket of currencies of Singapore's major trading partners. The composition of the basket
is revised periodically to take account of Singapore's trade patterns. Second, the MAS operates a managed float. The
trade-weighted exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate within an undisclosed policy band. If the exchange rate moves
outside the band, the MAS will step in, buying or selling foreign exchange to steer the exchange rate back within the
band. In conducting this policy, the MAS has generally given up control over domestic interest rates in order to
maintain its exchange rate within its target band. McCauley [2001] argues that the main target of this policy is
inflation.
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monetary policy. As the MAS put it: "the absence of exchange or capital controls, coupled with
the small size and openness of our economy, made the conduct of monetary policy that much
more difficult when Singapore shifted to an exchange rate-centered monetary policy in 1981".
[MAS, 2002, p. 2].
To support this policy, the MAS instituted an explicit policy of discouraging the
internationalization of the S$ by discouraging "the use of the S$ outside Singapore for activities
unrelated to its real economy". In 1983, when the policy was first codified, financial institutions
located in Singapore were forbidden to lend S$ to any residents or non-residents that planned to
take the S$ outside of the country. Moreover, there were restrictions on equities and foreign bond
listings by foreign companies in S$ to limit the development of an internationally connected
domestic capital markets denominated in S$'s. After nine years, in 1992, the policy was loosened
somewhat, when it was amended to allow the extension of S$ credit facilities of any amount to
non-residents provided that the S$ funds were used for real activities in Singapore. [MAS, 2002:
4]. Under that amendment, non-residents can only borrow S$ to finance their activities outside
Singapore provided the S$ proceeds are swapped into foreign currency. [MAS, 2001:13, fn. 9].
In addition, some restrictions were placed on inter-bank S$ derivatives, such as FX, currency and
interest rate swaps and options, which could facilitate the leveraging or hedging of S$ positions.
[MAS, 2002: p. 2]. As the SMA puts it, "These restrictions made it harder for potential
speculators to short the S$ and signaled unambiguously our disapproval of such speculation".
[ibid.]
In response to pressures from the domestic and foreign financial sectors for more
liberalization, the MAS has reviewed the non-internationalization policy four times since 1998,
and has liberalized it to some extent during these years. In August 1998, the MAS issued a new
directive, MAS 757, reaffirming the basic thrust of the non-internationalization policy, but
establishing clearer and more explicit provisions than previously. These more explicit regulations
reduced the need for banks to consult MAS, and then, to some extent, reduced the ability of
MAS to implement "moral suasion" and "supervision". Moreover, some activities, specifically
in relation to the arrangement of S$ equities listings and bond issues of foreign companies were
relaxed to foster the development of the capital market in Singapore [MAS, 2002, p. 4].
In late 1999, there was further liberalization of S$ interest rate derivatives. Moreover,
foreign companies were allowed to list S$ equity, provided the proceeds are converted into
foreign currency before being used outside Singapore. And in late 2000, key changes were made
to MAS 757 to allow banks to lend S$ to non-residents for investment purposes in Singapore.
These changes to MAS 757 were intended to allow non-residents to obtain S$ funding for
investment in S$ equities, bonds and real estate and broaden the investor base for S$ assets, and
to extend S$ credit facilities to non-residents to fund offshore activities, as long as the S$
proceeds were first swapped into foreign currency before being used outside Singapore. Finally,
in March of 2002, the policy was further liberalized, exempting individuals and non-financial
entities from the S$ lending restrictions, "recognizing…that such entities were not usually the
prime drivers of destabilizing currency speculation" [MAS, 2002. p. 5]. Moreover, the
amendments significantly loosened up restrictions on non-resident financial entities, to: transact
freely in asset swaps, cross currency swaps and cross-currency repos; and end any amount of S$denominated securities in exchange for both S$ or foreign currency-denominated collateral.

24

Previously, lending of S$ securities exceeding $5 million had to be fully collateralized by S$
collateral; transact freely in S$ FX options with non-resident entities. Previously, such
transactions had been allowed only if they were supported by underlying economic and financial
activities in Singapore [MAS, 2002].
Thus, following the revisions of March 2002, only two core requirements of the policy
remain. First, financial institutions may not extend S$ credit facilities in excess of S$ 5 million to
non-resident financial entities, where "they have reason to believe that the proceeds may be used
for speculation against the S$. This continues to be necessary to prevent offshore speculators
from accessing the liquidity in Singapore's onshore FX swaps and money markets. [MAS, 2002:
5]. Second, for a S$ loan to a non-resident financial entity exceeding S$ 5 million, or for a S$
equity or bond issue by a non-resident entity, that is used to fund overseas activities, the S$
proceeds must be swapped or converted into foreign currency before use outside Singapore.
Assessment
Observers attribute at least part of the success of Singapore's macroeconomic policy to
the significant capital management techniques that have hindered speculation against the S$ and
allowed authorities to pursue a managed exchange rate. The MAS itself finds its capital
management techniques extremely useful. A recent report states that: "The S$ has served
Singapore well. The strength and stability of the S$ have instilled confidence and kept inflation
low. These have in turn provided the foundation for sustained economic growth as well as
continued strengthening of the S$." [ibid]
According to the MAS, interest rates in S$ instruments have generally been lower than
corresponding US dollar rates. This has helped to keep the cost of capital low in Singapore.
Moreover, as a result, domestic banks and corporations did not suffer from the currency and
maturity mismatches that existed in other emerging-market economies. [MAS, 2001:13]. Part of
the reason that it was able to keep lower interest rates was an expectation of exchange rate
appreciation. It is important to note that Singapore avoided the familiar problems associated with
expectations of appreciation: namely massive capital inflows, overvaluation, and then crash [see
e.g. Taylor, 2002]. It seems likely that Singapore's capital management techniques, which
discouraged speculation against the currency, helped the country avoid that all too familiar
malady. It also helped to support Singapore's export-led model by keeping the exchange rate
from becoming excessively overvalued.
Supporting factors
The success of this policy is partly due to the ability of the MAS to use "moral suasion"
to discourage banks and other financial institutions from using the S$ for purposes of speculating
against (or in favor) of the local currency. Close, ongoing interaction between the MAS and
international and domestic financial institutions has allowed the MAS to shape and monitor
implementation of what appear to be deliberately vague formal regulations. Moral suasion allows
the MAS to make sure that loans are "tied to economic activities in Singapore.” Singapore's
“strong fundamentals" are often cited as the key to its policy success. These include low
inflation, fiscal surpluses, stable unit labor costs and current account surpluses -- factors that are
undoubtedly important.24 But often ignored is the role of capital management techniques in
24
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enhancing these fundamentals. In short, Singapore’s experience demonstrates that there is twoway causation between capital management techniques and fundamentals.
Costs
There has been no systematic analysis of the costs of Singapore's capital management
techniques; hence only qualitative guesses exist. Some have argued that the restrictions have
hindered the development of Singapore's capital markets, especially the bond markets, and may
have also reduced the inflow of foreign investment, though there is little hard evidence to support
these assertions [MAS, 2001]. Another possible cost is that the government of Singapore forgoes
the opportunity to earn seignorage from the international use of the S$; but there have been no
quantitative estimates of these costs to date.
Other achievements
Singapore has been able to maintain a high level of foreign direct investment and political
stability. Singapore's capital management techniques have contributed to this success by
allowing the MAS to maintain a stable exchange rate and avoid the financial crises that have
generated so much instability elsewhere in the region.
4. Malaysia25
Context
In the first two-thirds of the 1990s, Malaysia experienced rapid economic growth due to
growth in spending on infrastructure, FDI and exports. During this period, the Malaysian capital
account was so liberalized that there was an offshore market in ringgit, perhaps the only case of
an offshore market in an emerging-market currency [Rajaraman, 2001] Indeed, by most
conventional measures, Malaysia had had one of the longest running open capital accounts in the
developing world [Rajamaran, 2001].
Rapid economic growth in Malaysia came to a halt with the Asian financial crisis of
1997. The Malaysian government bucked trends in the region and, rather than implement an
IMF stabilization program, implemented capital controls and adopted an expansionary monetary
policy 14 months after September 1998. Malaysia’s introduction of capital controls was widely
seen as a major departure from its long reputation for a liberal capital account. The Malaysian
government, of course, had implemented capital controls in 1994, but these were eliminated
within a few months.
Objectives
The 1994 controls sought to reduce the threat of capital flight and protect the exchange
rate by reducing the volume of highly reversible capital inflows [see Ariyosi, et al. 2000; Jomo,
2001]. The 1998 controls had somewhat different goals. These were to facilitate expansionary
macroeconomic policy while defending the exchange rate, reduce capital flight, preserve foreign
exchange reserves and avoid an IMF stabilization program [Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002].
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Capital management techniques in Malaysia
Capital management in 1994. The 1994 measures sought to deter volatile capital inflows
by taxing them. This contrasts with the 1998 measures that restricted capital outflows. Had the
1994 controls not been withdrawn so soon, it is quite likely that the magnitude of capital flight
from mid-1997 would have been much less, and the 1997-98 crisis would have been far less
catastrophic.
The following measures sought to manage excess liquidity, especially to contain
speculative inflows, restore stability in financial markets and control inflationary measures.26
The eligible liabilities base for computing statutory reserve and liquidity requirements was
redefined to include all funds inflows from abroad, thus raising the cost of foreign funds
compared to domestic funds; limits on non trade-related external liabilities of banking
institutions were introduced; sale of short-term monetary instruments was only limited to
Malaysian residents to prevent foreigners from using such investments as substitutes for
placements of deposits (this measure was lifted on 12 August 1994); commercial banks were
required to place ringgit funds of foreign banks in non-interest bearing vostro accounts;
commercial banks were not permitted to undertake non-trade-related swaps (including overnight
swaps) and outright forward transactions on the bid side with foreign customers to prevent
offshore parties from establishing speculative long forward ringgit positions while the ringgit
was perceived to be undervalued (this measure was lifted from 16 August 1994); the statutory
reserve requirements of all financial institutions were raised thrice during 1994 — by one
percentage point each time — to absorb excess liquidity on a more permanent basis, absorbing
an estimated RM4.8 billion from the banking system.
The controls—introduced after the sudden collapse of the Malaysian stock market in
early 1994—were withdrawn after about six months. The central bank saw the problem as one
of excess liquidity due to the massive inflow of short-term funds from abroad due to higher
interest rates in Malaysia, the buoyant stock market and expectations of ringgit appreciation.
Capital management in September 1998. The policy package is generally recognized as
comprehensive and well designed to limit foreign exchange outflows and ringgit speculation by
non-residents as well as residents, while not adversely affecting foreign direct investors. The
offshore ringgit market had facilitated exchange rate turbulence in 1997-98. Thus, the measures
were designed to eliminate this source of disturbance.
The measures introduced on 1 September 1998 were designed to achieve the following
objectives [Rajaraman, 2001; BNM; Mahathir; Jomo 2001]:
•
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eliminate the offshore ringgit market, by prohibiting the transfer of funds into the
country from externally held ringgit accounts except for investment in Malaysia
(excluding credit to residents), or for purchase of goods in Malaysia. The offshore
ringgit market could only function with externally held ringgit accounts in
correspondent banks in Malaysia because offshore banks required freely usable
access to onshore ringgit bank accounts to match their ringgit liabilities, which the

For a fuller account, see BNM’s 1994 Annual Report (especially the Foreword, Boxes A to J and pp. 42-44).
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•

•
•
•
•

new ruling prohibited. Holders of offshore deposits were given the month of
September 1998 to repatriate their deposits to Malaysia. This eliminated the major
source of ringgit for speculative buying of US dollars in anticipation of a ringgit
crash. Large-denomination ringgit notes were later demonetized to make the
circulation of the ringgit currency outside Malaysia more difficult.
eliminate access by non-residents to domestic ringgit sources by prohibiting ringgit
credit facilities to them. All trade transactions now had to be settled in foreign
currencies, and only authorized depository institutions were allowed to handle
transactions in ringgit financial assets.
shut down the offshore market in Malaysian shares conducted through the Central
Limit Order Book (CLOB) in Singapore.
obstruct speculative outward capital flows by requiring prior approval for Malaysian
residents to invest abroad in any form, and limiting exports of foreign currency by
residents for other than valid current account purposes.
protect the ringgit’s value and raise foreign exchange reserves by requiring
repatriation of export proceeds within six months from the time of export.
further insulate monetary policy from the foreign exchange market by imposing a 12month ban on the outflow of external portfolio capital (only on the principal; interest
and dividend payments could be freely repatriated).

The September 1998 measures imposed a 12-month waiting period for repatriation of
investment proceeds from the liquidation of external portfolio investments. To pre-empt a largescale outflow at the end of the 12 month period in September 1999 and to try to attract new
portfolio investments from abroad, a system of graduated exit levies was introduced from 15
February 1999, with different rules for capital already in the country and for capital brought in
after that date. For capital already in the country, there was an exit tax inversely proportional to
the duration of stay within the earlier stipulated period of 12 months. Capital that had entered the
country before 15 February 1998 was free to leave without paying any exit tax. For new capital
yet to come in, the levy would only be imposed on profits, defined to exclude dividends and
interest, also graduated by length of stay. In effect, profits were being defined by the new rules as
realized capital gains.
Credit facilities for share as well as property purchases were actually increased as part of
the package. The government has even encouraged its employees to take second mortgages for
additional property purchases at its heavily discounted interest rate.
\
The exchange controls, still in place, limit access to ringgit for non-residents, preventing
the re-emergence of an offshore ringgit market. Free movement from ringgit to dollars for
residents is possible, but dollars must be held in foreign exchange accounts in Malaysia, e.g. at
the officially approved foreign currency offshore banking center on Labuan.
Assessment
Did Malaysia’s September 1998 selective capital control measures succeed? They clearly
succeeded in meeting some of the government's objectives. The offshore ringgit market was
eliminated by the September 1998 measures. By late 1999, international rating agencies had
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begun restoring Malaysia’s credit rating, e.g., the Malaysian market was re-inserted on the
Morgan Stanley Capital International Indices in May 2000.
But, did these controls succeed in the sense of allowing more rapid recovery of the
Malaysian economy? The merits and demerits of the Malaysian government’s regime of capital
controls to deal with the regional currency and financial crises will continue to be debated for a
long time to come. Proponents claim that the economic and stock market decline came to a stop
soon after the controls were implemented [Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002; Jomo, ed. 2001; Palma,
2000; Dornbusch, 2002]. On the other hand, opponents argue that such reversals have been more
pronounced in the rest of the region. Kaplan and Rodrik present strong evidence that the
controls did have a significant positive effect on the ability of Malaysia to weather the 1997
crisis and reflate its economy. While this debate is likely to go on for some time, our reading of
the evidence suggests that Kaplan and Rodrik are correct: controls segmented financial markets
and provided breathing room for domestic monetary and financial policies; and they allowed for
a speedier recovery than would have been possible via the orthodox IMF route.
Supporting factors
In the other cases we discuss in section IV, prior experience with capital management
techniques have been important to the success of capital management in the 1990s. However,
the case of Malaysia seems quite different: the country had a highly liberalized capital account
prior to the 1990s. Nonetheless, the government was able to implement numerous capital
management techniques, all under rather difficult circumstances. This suggests that a history of
capital management is not a necessary pre-requisite for policy success.
Costs
It is difficult to identify any significant costs associated with the short-lived 1994
controls. The most important cost of the 1998 controls was the political favoritism associated
with their implementation. It is difficult, however, to estimate the economic costs of political
favoritism [Jomo, 2001; Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002; Johnson and Mitton 2002]. Moreover, these
costs (if quantified) must be weighed against the significant evidence of the macroeconomic
benefits of the 1998 controls.
Other achievements
The Malaysian experience in 1994 and 1998 enriches debate on the policy options
available to developing countries. The experience of 1998, in particular, demonstrates that it is
possible for outflow controls to achieve their objectives.
5. India27
Following Independence from Britain, India had for many decades a highly controlled
economy, with exchange and capital controls an integral part of the developmental state
apparatus. Over time, and partly in response to economic crisis, India gradually liberalized and
with respect to the capital account, this process of liberalization greatly accelerated in the 1990's.
Most mainstream observers have suggested that the pace of liberalization is far too slow.
However, supporters of gradual liberalization point to the relative success India has had in
27
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insulating itself from the excesses of the international financial markets which led to the crises of
some of its neighbors in 1997.
Context
The Indian financial system and Indian approach to capital management are best
understood in the context of its history of colonization, and the subsequent developmentalist plan
that it pursued following independence in 1947. Given the history of British colonialism, policy
makers were understandably guarded in terms of their openness to foreign capital. In terms of the
external account, in the first few years following independence, an intricate set of controls
evolved for all external transactions. Equity investments were further restricted in 1977 when
many multinational companies left India, rejecting the government's effort to enforce a law that
required them to dilute their equity in their Indian operations to 40 percent. Although the eighties
saw the beginning of new industrial reforms, the general consensus was still that export
orientation and openness could not provide a reasonable basis for growth.
Like many other developing countries, India’s decision to dramatically liberalize its
intricately planned economy in 1991 was necessitated by a balance of payments crisis. By March
1991, the crisis had reached severe proportions. India turned to the IMF for an emergency loan,
and the resultant conditionalities led to the adoption of extensive liberalization measures.
Objectives
The goals of India’s capital management techniques are to foster financial development
(through gradual capital account liberalization) and attract foreign investment. Prudential
financial regulations aim to reduce the likelihood of speculative crises driven by excessive
foreign borrowing and to help authorities manage the exchange rate. To further this goal, capital
management has attempted to shift the composition of capital inflows from debt to equity. In
addition, capital management techniques have been oriented towards maintenance of domestic
financial stability by limiting foreign equity and foreign currency deposit investments in the
financial sector. In addition, the government has sought to retain domestic savings, stabilize the
domestic financial sector by limiting the deposits of foreign currencies, and allocate foreign
equity investment to strategic sectors, such as information technology.
Capital management techniques in India
India has had significant controls on both inflows and outflows. These controls have
applied to a broad spectrum of assets and liabilities, applying to debt, equity and currency. These
capital management techniques have involved strict regulation of financial institutions, as well as
controls of external transactions. Although the Indian economy has moved towards a
progressively freer capital market, this has been an extremely gradual process28. In particular, the
management of integration into the world financial market has been based, until very recently, on
fundamental asymmetries between residents and non-residents, and between corporates and
individuals. While non-resident corporates enjoy substantial freedom to repatriate funds, until
recently this has been severely limited in the case of individual non residents. Resident
corporates have had to obtain approval of various sorts before exporting capital, and resident
individuals are, for all practical purposes subject to very strict and low limited with respect to
28
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these. Moreover, three have been restrictions on debt accumulation as well as foreign currency
deposits and loans by domestic financial institutions.
Controls on outflows. As mentioned above, the liberalization process has maintained a
clear distinction between residents and non-residents: it has maintained strict controls on
outflows by residents, while giving significant latitude to non-residents to repatriate funds. In the
most recent budget, however, this fundamental tenet of India's recent capital management
techniques, has been changed, at least on an experimental basis. Restrictions on individuals and
domestic corporates have been loosened to allow substantial investments abroad. Most
significantly, mutual funds in India are now permitted to invest up to 1 billion dollars abroad.
Moreover, individuals are now permitted to invest abroad without limit. In addition, companies
can now invest in foreign companies too, but there is a quantitative restriction on the amount
(less than 25% of the company's worth). If this recent liberalization is retained on a permanent
basis, it will represent a fundamental change in India's capital management techniques.
Borrowing and short-term debt accumulation and prudential regulation. Prudential
regulations having capital account implications are widespread in India. Responding to the
lessons of the 1997 Asian crisis, commercial borrowing in foreign currencies has remained
significantly curtailed. Commercial banks, unlike in some East Asian countries, have not been
and are still not allowed to accept deposits or to extend loans which are denominated in foreign
currencies. As Nayyar [2000] describes the crisis context of India's initial reform: “It prompted
strict regulation of external commercial borrowing especially short-term debt. It led to a
systematic effort to discourage volatile capital flows associated with repatriable non-resident
deposits. Most important, perhaps, it was responsible for the change in emphasis and the shift in
preference from debt creating capital flows to non-debt creating capital flows” [Nayyar, 2000].
Foreign direct investment. Before liberalization, FDI and equity investments were
strictly controlled in virtually all sectors. By the early 2000's, however, these restrictions have
been significantly lifted. The first steps in liberalization involved lifting restrictions on FDI. By
1993 when there were far reaching changes in the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of
1973. Some of these reforms may have been used as a tool of industrial policy, guiding FDI into
certain industries, including computer hardware and software, engineering industries, services,
electronics and electrical equipment, infrastructure projects, chemical and allied products, and
food and dairy products. Recent changes have meant that by 2001-2002, most sectors are open to
FDI. Still, important restrictions remain. In particular, FDI is severely restricted in banking,
finance, real estate and infrastructure.
Portfolio investment. The attitude towards portfolio investment liberalization has been
equally gradual. India’s first attempt to capture part of the growing funds being channeled into
emerging markets came during the second half of the 1980s, as India opened five closed-end
mutuals for sale on offshore markets. They also reformed the structure of equity regulations on
the Stock Exchanges. By the late 90’s, the limits on foreign institutional investor ownership of
share capital had been lifted almost up to the level of majority stakes.
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Assessment
India has had some successes and a few question marks in this decade of capital account
management. On the credit side, India has had consistent net inflows (a legacy of its
discrimination between residents and non residents) and has not had any major financial
meltdowns in a decade that saw three serious crises around the world (and one literally next
door). Some of this has certainly been due to the prudential discrimination between various types
of flows.
Another major element on the credit side has been India’s success in increasing the share
of non-debt creating inflows. There has been a particularly impressive reduction in short-term
loans. However, India has had only limited success in attracting foreign direct investment instead
of portfolio investment. In fact, the decade has seen a marginally greater percentage of foreign
inflows being accounted for by FPI than by FDI (52% to 48%)
India's exchange rate policy seems to have worked. Although there has been a steady
decline in the external value of the rupee, there have been relatively few periods of volatility, and
the only really difficult period (in 1997) saw the external value fall by 16%.
Supporting factors
Among the contributing factors to the success of India's partial liberalization process and
continuing use of capital management techniques, three are most important. First is the
widespread institutional experience of the Indian authorities in managing controls, including
long-standing experience with regulating Indian financial institutions. Second, the controls
themselves were well-designed, clearly demarcating the distinction between resident and nonresident transactions. Finally, liberalization of FDI and the very success of the controls
themselves contributed to the ability of India to accumulate foreign exchange reserves and limit
the accumulation of foreign debt, both of which reduced the vulnerability of the Indian economy.
Costs
In India's case, this is a complex question because the Indian economy has been
undergoing a dramatic liberalization process, which is only ten years old. It is hard to disentangle
the costs of the controls from the costs of previous controls, or indeed, from the costs of the
liberalization process itself and other factors, both internal and external. For example, many
observers still point to the relatively underdeveloped financial markets in India compared to
other semi-industrialized economies. But these are certainly due to many factors, including
previous controls, and cannot be necessarily attributed to the current controls, which fall mostly
on residents, and, in any case, have been in place for a relatively short time. In short, assessing
the costs of the current system will undoubtedly have to wait for more information.
Other achievements
As suggested above, India's capital management techniques clearly helped to insulate
India's economy from the ravages of the 1997 Asian financial crisis [Rajamarn, 2001]. By
limiting capital flight by residents, they have also helped to retain domestic savings that are
critical for domestic investment.
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6. China29
Among the cases we study in this paper, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has, the
most comprehensive foreign exchange and capital controls, by far. At the same time, China's
record of economic growth and development in the last several decades, as well as its ability to
attract high levels of foreign direct investment has been greatly admired by many countries both
in the developed and developing world. Finally, like its neighbor India, China was able to avoid
highly significant negative repercussions from the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990's. The
relatively strict capital controls along side enviable economic growth and the ability to attract
large quantities of foreign capital starkly calls into question the common view among economists
that capital controls necessarily hinder economic growth and deter capital inflows. Indeed,
China's policies suggest that, under the right conditions, strong capital management techniques
might be useful in protecting macroeconomic stability and enhancing economic growth and
development.
Context
As is well known, the People's Republic of China has achieved an admirable record of
success in terms of economic growth and development in the last decade or more, averaging an
annual growth rate of GDP of 8 percent or more, depending on one's view of the accuracy of the
PRC's government statistics. This record has been associated with a high savings rates, 40% of
GDP or more, a long record of current account surpluses, a large inflow of foreign direct
investment (even discounting for the fact that half or more of it may really be 'domestic
investment' which is 'round-tripped' through Hong Kong or elsewhere in order to take advantage
of preferential treatment afforded to foreign investors), a huge stock of foreign exchange
reserves, and, even in light of a substantial foreign debt, a likely net creditor status [see for
example, Icard, 2002]. After a short period of high inflation and interest rates in the mid-1990's,
China has experienced low domestic interest rates and, more recently, deflation.30 In terms of
exchange rate management, China has maintained a fairly consistent U.S. dollar peg. Whether
this is a "hard" or "soft" peg is a matter of some controversy.
Objectives
Capital management techniques in China are an integral part of China's development
strategy, implemented by its "developmental state." The objectives of the controls evolved over
time, but generally have included the following: to retain savings; to help channel savings to
desired uses; to help insulate China's pegged exchange rate in order to maintain China's export
competitiveness; to reduce the circumvention of other controls such as tariffs; to protect
domestic sectors from foreign investment; to strengthen China's macroeconomic policy
autonomy; and to insulate the economy from foreign financial crises.
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Capital management techniques in China
China has followed a fascinating pattern of economic liberalization since the early 1980's,
one that does not conform to any simplistic view of sequencing commonly found in the
economics literature. The typical, currently prescribed liberalization sequence starts with
liberalizing the trade account, then relaxing foreign exchange restrictions, then the long term
capital account, then the short term capital account [eg. Johnston, 1998]. Instead, China has
liberalized quite selectively within each of these categories, often on an experimental basis, and
sometimes moving a step or two backwards before moving once again forward This complex
pattern of experimentation and liberalization thus defies easy description, and makes oversimplification in a short summary such as this almost inevitable.
When China, under the leadership of Deng Xiao Ping embarked on its experimentation
with liberalization and integration into the world economy, it had comprehensive controls over
foreign exchange, current account and capital account transactions. In its experimentation with
Special Economic Zones it began to allow foreign investment in foreign minority owned jointventures, and liberalized to some extent controls over necessary imports for these "foreign
invested enterprises". (See Braunstein and Epstein, 2001, for a brief summary and references).
Many of these restrictions were loosened over time and a major change in capital
management techniques occurred in 1996 with China's acceptance of IMF ArticleVIII and the
consequent liberalization of foreign exchange controls with respect to current account
transactions. Moreover, since that time, controls over inflows and outflows by non-residents
have been significantly loosened. Still, strict foreign exchange controls have been retained; in
addition controls over foreign ownership of domestic assets have been retained to allow
industrial policy tools with respect to foreign investment to be effective. In addition, strict
controls over outflows and inflows of capital by domestic residents have been retained. Still,
significant exceptions have been made, partly by choice and partly by necessity, to allow a
somewhat porous capital account, and thereby facilitating some capital outflows (capital flight)
and round tripping of foreign direct investment.
China's current capital management techniques have the following characteristics [Icard,
2002; IMF, 2000; Haihong, 2000]31: strict exchange controls on the capital account but few
restrictions on the current account; some liberalized sectors for equity inflows and outflows by
non-residents accompanied by some sectors of quite strict controls on non-resident equity
inflows, eg. banking, insurance and the stock market; strict controls on foreign borrowing by
residents, including on currency denomination and maturity structure of debt inflows; strict but
porous controls on inflows and outflows by residents; tight regulations over domestic interest
rates.
Assessment
The system of capital and exchange controls has been an integral part of China's
development strategy of the last twenty years. The Chinese government could not have pursued
its policy of incremental liberalization based on exports, extensive infrastructure spending, and
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labor-intensive FDI, expansionary monetary and fiscal policy and competitiveness oriented
exchange rate policy without its system of exchange and capital controls. Given that China's
growth record in the past twenty years is the envy of much of the world, and the important role
played by the capital management techniques, one must deem them a success in terms of
reaching the Chinese government's objectives.
Most recent commentary has focused on the role that the controls may have played in
insulating the Chinese economy from speculative excesses. More specifically, this system of
controls is widely credited with helping China avoid the boom- bust cycle associated with the
Asian financial crisis [eg. Fernald and Babson, 1999; Eichengreen, 2002; Haihong, 2000].
Controls on foreign debt accumulation prevented the excessive accumulation of unsustainable
amounts and maturities of foreign debt by resident institutions; controls on equity inflows
prevented a speculative bubble in the stock market from spilling over into over sectors of the
economy, and limited, to some extent, the fall out from bubbles in real estate and other assets;
controls on outflows prevented devastating surges of capital flight; exchange controls and the
control over derivative and futures markets limited the desirability and feasibility of domestic
and foreign residents speculating on the renminbi.
At the same time, we note the paradox of tight controls with large amounts of "capital
flight" and "round-tripped" investment. The Chinese authorities have clearly tolerated a degree
of flexibility in the controls. Some of this is undoubtedly related to possible corruption and
unwanted evasion. But some of it reflects a "safety valve", allowing some evasion at the margins
in order to protect the average effectiveness of the controls; and some of the "evasion" is allowed
in order to allow other objectives. This ebb and flow of capital flight thus to some extent reflects,
the "dynamic" nature of the controls, with the Chinese authorities tightening enforcement during
periods of perceived need, including during crisis periods and then loosening them when the
crisis subsides.
Supporting factors
The most important factors supporting the success of capital management techniques in
China are: the government's extensive experience with implementing economic controls; the
comprehensive nature of the controls; the success in building foreign exchange reserves through
exports and FDI; and the flexibility of policy.
Costs
Capital management in China is not without cost. China's financial system does not have
the breadth and depth of financial systems in more advanced economies, such as the USA.
Capital management, while facilitating China's industrial policies, has also facilitated the
accumulation of bad debts at China's state banks [Lardy, 2000]. Capital management (as with
other aspects of China's state-guided policies) has facilitated credit allocation and industrial
policies. But it has also created opportunities for corruption by government officials. These costs
are likely to have been outweighed by the significant contributions that capital management has
played in China's highly successful economic development over the past several decades.
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Other achievements
Even though there has been significant capital flight from China, most observers have
suggested that capital flight would have been significantly greater in the absence of the capital
management techniques employed. Further, capital management policies have allowed the
Chinese government to follow an expansionary monetary policy to try to counter the strong
deflationary forces pressures facing the Chinese economy. Finally, China is the largest recipient
of FDI among developing countries. While some argue that capital management discourages
FDI inflows [Wei, 2000], the econometric evidence on this point lacks robustness. Moreover,
interviews on this subject do not suggest that capital management has been an obstacle to FDI.
Indeed, sound capital management appears to encourage FDI inflows [Rosen, 1999].
V. LESSONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CAPITAL MANAGEMENT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. Lessons
What lessons can we learn from these case studies about capital management techniques
and their possible use to developing countries that are trying to navigate the often-treacherous
waters of the world economy? To clear the field for the positive lessons that we draw from our
cases, we first consider six commonly held mistaken claims about capital management
techniques.
One common view of capital management is that it can only work in the "short run" but
not the "long-run." However, with the exception of Malaysia all of our cases show that
management can achieve important objectives over a significant number of years. Taking China
and Singapore as two cases at different ends of the spectrum in terms of types of controls, we
have seen that both countries effectively employed capital management techniques for more than
a decade in the service of important policy objectives.
A second common view is that for capital management to work for a long period of time,
measures have to be consistently strengthened. In fact, the reality is much more complex than
this. As the cases of Malaysia, Chile and China show, at times of stress, it may be necessary to
strengthen controls to address leakages that are exploited by the private sector. However, as these
same cases demonstrate, controls can be loosened when a crisis subsides or when the
international environment changes, and then reinstated or strengthened as necessary. More
generally, looking at a broad cross-section of country experiences, one finds that the use of
dynamic capital management means that management evolves endogenously according to the
situation and the evolution of government goals [Cardoso and Goldfajn, 1999].
We see that in the case of Chile, for example, capital management techniques were
adjusted several times (and ultimately abandoned) during the 1990's in response to changes in
the economic environment. Chilean policymakers sought and won the right to reinstate these
controls during its bilateral trade negotiations with the USA. In Malaysia, capital management
was strengthened to address evasion during the Asian financial crisis, and then were eventually
loosened. In Singapore, the government strengthens enforcement and moral suasion during times
of stress, and then steps away from this strategy when the situation changes. In China, the
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enforcement of capital management is loosened or tightened depending on exchange rate
pressures or reserve levels. In short, dynamic capital management techniques have been
successfully utilized in a range of countries.
A third common, but misleading view, is that for capital management to work, there must
be an experienced bureaucracy in place. It is certainly true that having experience helps. China,
India, Singapore are all examples of countries that have long-term experience with government
direction of the economy. Malaysia, however, is an important counter-example: it was a country
that was able to successfully implement capital management even without having had a great
deal of experience in doing so. In the case of Chile, to take another example, the central bank had
had no obvious previous experience implementing the reserve requirement scheme, though it had
had some negative experiences in trying to implement capital controls in the 1970's. In short,
having experience is no doubt helpful, but it does not seem to be a pre-requisite for
implementing successful capital management techniques. What is more important is state
capacity and administrative capacity as discussed in sections III and IV.
Fourth, a recent view that has gained currency is that controls on capital inflows work,
but those on outflows do not. However, in our sample we have seen examples of policy success
in both dimensions. For example, Chile and Colombia maintained controls on inflows, while
China, India and Malaysia maintained controls on outflows. In addition, Singapore and Taiwan
POC maintain controls on the ability of residents and non-residents to use domestic currency
offshore for purposes of "speculating" against the home currency. This is a control on outflows
that has successfully insulated these countries from crises and has helped governments to
manage their exchange rates.
Fifth, a common view is that capital management techniques impose significant costs by
leading to higher costs of capital, especially for small firms. As we have seen, in some cases
there may be some merit to these arguments. But much more evidence needs to be presented
before this is established as a widespread cost.32
We turn, now, to the positive lessons that we draw from our case studies of capital
management techniques. Tables 1 and 2 summarize our findings.
First and most generally, we find that capital management techniques can contribute to
currency and financial stability, macro and micro-economic policy autonomy, stable long-term
investment and sound current account performance. There are some costs associated with capital
management techniques: for instance, there is evidence that in some countries the cost of capital
to small firms is increased; and capital management can create space for corruption.
Second, successful implementation of controls over a significant period of time depends
on the presence of a sound policy environment and strong fundamentals. These include a
32

In any case, this observation is just the beginning of the analysis since it says nothing about the balance of costs
and benefits. As economists are fond of pointing out, there are always trade-offs. Our cases demonstrate that capital
management techniques can have important macroeconomic or prudential benefits. Of course, these benefits must
be weighed against the micro costs. But as James Tobin was fond of remarking, "It takes a lot of Harberger
Triangles to fill an Okun Gap".
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relatively low debt ratio, moderate rates of inflation, sustainable current account and fiscal
balances, consistent exchange rate policies, a public sector that functions well enough to be able
to implement coherent policies (i.e., administrative capacity), and governments that are
sufficiently independent of narrow political interests so that they can maintain some degree of
control over the financial sector (i.e., state capacity).
But, third, as our cases show, causation works both ways: from good fundamentals to
successful capital management techniques, and from successful capital management techniques
to good fundamentals. Good fundamentals are important to the long-run success of capital
management techniques because they reduce the stress on these controls, and thereby enhance
their chance of success. On the other hand, these techniques also improve fundamentals. Thus,
there is a synergy between capital management techniques and fundamentals.
Fourth, the dynamic aspects of capital management techniques are, perhaps, their most
important feature. Policymakers need to retain the ability to implement a variety of management
techniques and alter them as circumstances warrant. Nimble and flexible capital management is
very desirable. Chile and Taiwan POC's experience with these techniques is a good example of
this type of flexibility. Countries with successful experiences with controls must maintain the
option to continue using them as circumstances warrant.
Fifth, capital management techniques work best when they are coherent and consistent
with the overall aims of the economic policy regime, or better yet, when they are an integral part
of a national economic vision. To be clear, this vision does not have to be one of widespread
state control over economic activity. Singapore is a good example of an economy that is highly
liberalized in some ways, but one where capital management techniques are an integral part of an
overall vision of economic policy and development.33
Sixth, prudential regulations are often an important complement to capital controls,
traditionally defined, and vice versa. In Singapore, for example, government moral suasion
aimed at discouraging banks from lending to firms or individuals intending to speculate against
the currency is an example of an effective prudential regulation. In Chile, taxes on short-term
inflows that prevent maturity mismatches is an example of a capital control that also serves as a
prudential regulation. Our case studies present many such examples.
Seventh, there is not one type of capital management technique that works best for all
countries: in other words, there is no one "best practice" when it comes to capital management
techniques. We have found a variety of strategies that work in countries with very different
levels of state and administrative capacities, with financial systems that differ according to their
depth and degree of liberalization, with different mixes of dynamic and static controls, and
different combinations of prudential financial regulations and capital controls.
Many countries that have had extensive controls in the past are now liberalizing them.
Do our case studies offer any insight as to whether countries that employ extensive capital
management techniques should begin to abandon them? Our research suggests, that in many
cases, it is not in the interests of developing countries to seek full capital account liberalization.
33

See Nembhard, 1992, for an excellent discussion of these issues.
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The lesson of dynamic capital management is that countries need to have the flexibility to both
tighten and loosen controls.
However, if countries completely liberalize their capital accounts, they might find it very
difficult to re-establish any degree of control when the situation warrants or even demands it.
This is because market actors might see the attempt to re-establish capital management as
abandonment of a liberalized capital account, and then might react rather radically to this
perceived change. By contrast, if investors understand that a country is maintaining a system of
dynamic capital management they will expect management to tighten and loosen over time. It is
therefore less likely that investors will over-react if management techniques are tightened.
In sum, we have shown that the capital management techniques employed in seven
developing countries during the 1990's have achieved many important objectives. The
achievements of these capital management techniques therefore warrant close examination by
policymakers in developing countries
B. Opportunities
Clearly, there are many obstacles confronting efforts to pursue the most stringent forms
of capital management in developing countries. However, we submit that at present there are
many reasons for cautious optimism regarding the ability of developing countries to pursue
various capital management techniques.
1.) All capital management techniques are not equally controversial or potentially costly
to countries that pursue them. Our cases show that rather stringent regimes of capital
management are often consistent with economies that are largely liberalized. Moreover, we are
unable to find convincing evidence that investors have penalized countries with attractive
investment opportunities and well-designed regimes of capital management.
2.) There is growing recognition of the achievements of certain capital management
techniques [Eichengreen, 1999; Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001; Krugman, 1999; Ocampo, 2002;
Rodrik, 1999;] and of the costs of premature capital account liberalization [Bhagwati, 1998;
Edwards, 2001; Eichengreen, 1999, 2002; Krugman, 1999; Rodrik, 1998, 2002].
3.) The recent deliberations during the US’ bilateral trade negotiations with Chile and
Singapore revealed interesting fractures within the US Treasury and the US business community
over the right of developing countries to impose capital controls as they are deemed necessary.
In the reporting on these negotiations it appeared that prominent members of the US
manufacturing and export community and various Treasury department officials were not in
support of the hard-line stance against capital controls initially held by the US negotiating team
[see WSJ, 12/9/02:A4; NYT, 12/12/02:C1]. The shape of the final agreements signed with Chile
and Singapore suggest that those favoring at least a degree of national autonomy on the matter of
capital controls have more influence than was initially apparent [see NYT, 1/9/03:C3; 1/17/03, p.
C19]. The commitment of the negotiators from Chile and Singapore to maintain their right to
impose controls is a stance that other countries may wish to build upon.
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4.) There is a clear softening in the stance on capital controls (and acknowledgement of
their achievements in some countries) in the US business press since the Asian crisis [WSJ,
10/24/02]. The IMF, too, appears to be softening its stance toward capital controls [e.g., Prasad,
Rogoff, Wei, and Kose, 2003]. Reports by some staff economists and statements by key
decision makers at the institution have acknowledged that capital management techniques
explain the resilience of some countries during the Asian crisis [Ariyoshi et al., 2000; Fischer,
2002; WSJ, 10/24/02].34 It may also be the case that there is increased tolerance for
administrative controls over capital movements in the post-September 11th environment. In this
context, security concerns and new regulations aimed at reducing money laundering may make
capital controls far easier to enforce and far easier to defend.
Recent events suggest that this may be a propitious time for policymakers in developing
countries to build on the successful experiences with capital management in some countries, and
to avail themselves of their Article 6 right to pursue them. It is important to recognize that the
greater the number of developing countries that pursue capital management, the easier and less
costly it will be for others to follow this path. In this connection, it might also be a fruitful time
for those countries that have had success with particular techniques to play a larger role in
financial policy discussions in the developing world. In this connection, we believe that the G24 can play an important role in providing a forum for such discussions.

34

For instance, Stanley Fischer [2002] writes: “The IMF has cautiously supported the use of market-based capital
inflow controls, Chilean style. These could be helpful for a country seeking to avoid the difficulties posed for
domestic policy by capital inflows.” Eduardo Aninat, Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, recently stated that:
“In certain scenarios and in some circumstances, these controls on capital inflows can play a role in reducing
vulnerability created by short-term flows…The investment restrictions appear to have served Chile well…” [WSJ,
10/24/02]
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Table 1
Summary: Types and Objectives of Capital Management Techniques Employed During
the 1990's*
Country

Types of Capital Management Techniques

Chile

Inflows
FDI and PI: One year Residence
Requirement
30% URR
Tax on foreign loans: 1.2% per year
Outflows: No significant restrictions
Domestic financial Regulations:
strong regulatory measures
Similar to Chile
Inflows
non-residents
-bank accounts can only be used for domestic
spending, not financial speculation
-foreign participation in stock market
regulated
-FDI tightly regulated
residents
regulation of foreign borrowing
Outflows
Exchange controls
Domestic Financial Regulations
-restrictions on lending for real estate and
other speculative purposes

Colombia
Taiwan POC

Singapore

Objectives of Capital Management
Techniques
-Lengthen maturity structures and
stabilize inflows
-help manage exchange rates to
maintain export competitiveness
-protect economy from financial
instability
Similar to Chile
-Promote industrialization
-Help manage exchange for export
competitiveness
-Maintain financial stability and
insulate from foreign financial crises

"Non-Internationalization" of Singapore $
inflows

-to prevent speculation against
Singapore $

outflows
non-residents
-financial institutions can't extend S$ credit to
non-residents if they are likely to use for
speculation

-to support "soft peg" of S$

-non-residents: if they borrow for use abroad,
must swap first into foreign currency

-to help maintain export
competitiveness
-to help insulate Singapore from
foreign financial crises

Domestic Financial Regulations
-restrictions on creation of swaps, and other
derivatives that could be used for speculation
against S$
Malaysia (1998)

-to maintain political and economic
sovereignty

Inflows
-restrictions on foreign borrowing
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India

China

Outflows
non-residents
-12 month repatriation waiting period
-graduated exit levies
inversely proportional to length of stay

- kill the offshore ringgit market

residents
exchange controls

-to help create financial stability and
insulate the economy from contagion

domestic financial regulations
non-residents
-restrict access to ringgit
residents
encourage to borrow domestically and invest
Inflows
non-residents
Strict Regulation of FDI and PI

-shut down offshore share market
-to help reflate the economy

-support industrial policy
-pursue capital account liberalization in
an incremental and controlled fashion

Outflows
non-residents
-none

-insulate domestic economy from
financial contagion

residents
exchange controls

-preserve domestic savings and forex
reserves

Domestic Financial Regulations
-strict limitations on development of domestic
financial markets

-help stabilize exchange rate

Inflows
non-residents
-strict regulation on sectoral FDI investment
-regulation of equity investments: segmented
stock market

-support industrial policy

Outflows
non-residents
-no restrictions on repatriation of funds
-strict limitations on borrowing Chinese
Renminbi for speculative purposes
residents
exchange controls

-pursue capital account liberalization in
incremental and controlled fashion
-insulate domestic economy from
financial contagion
-increase political sovereignty
-preserve domestic savings and foreign
exchange reserves
-help keep exchange rates at
competitive levels

Domestic Financial Regulations
-strict limitations on residents and nonresidents
*Sources: See Section IV.
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Table 2
Summary: Assessment of the Capital Management Techniques Employed During the
1990s*
Country

Achievements

Supporting Factors

Costs

Chile

-altered composition and
maturity of inflows
-currency stability
-reduced vulnerability to
contagion

-limited evidence
of higher capital
costs for SMEs

Colombia

-similar to Chile, but less
successful in several
respects

-well-designed policies
and sound fundamentals
-neoliberal economic
policy in many domains
-offered foreign
investors good returns
-state and administrative
capacity
-dynamic capital
management
-less state and
administrative capacity
than in Chile meant that
blunter policies were
employed
-economic reforms in
the direction of
neoliberalism

Taiwan POC

-debt burdens and
financial fragility are
insignificant
-competitive exchange
rate and stable currency
-insulated from financial
crises
-enhanced economic
sovereignty

-high levels of state and
administrative capacity
--policy independence
of the CBC
-dynamic capital
management

Singapore

-insulated from
disruptive speculation
-protection of soft peg
-financial stability

-strong state capacity
and ability to use moral
suasion
-strong economic
fundamentals

Malaysia 1998

-facilitated
macroeconomic reflation

-public support for
policies

-limited evidence
of concentration
of lending to
large firms,
conservatism of
banks,
inadequate
auditing and risk
and project
assessment
capabilities
-large informal
financial sector
-limited evidence
of inadequate
liquidity in
financial system
-possibly
undermined
financial sector
development
-loss of
seignorage
-possibly
contributed to
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No evidence
available

-helped to maintain
domestic economic
sovereignty
India

China

-facilitated incremental
liberalization
-insulated from financial
contagion
- helped preserve
domestic saving
-helped maintain
economic sovereignty

-facilitated industrial
policy -insulated
economy from financial
contagion
-helped preserve savings
-helped manage
exchange rate and
facilitate export-led
growth
-helped maintain
expansionary macropolicy
-helped maintain
economic sovereignty

-strong state and
administrative capacity
-dynamic capital
management
-strong state and
administrative capacity
-stong public support
for policies
-experience with state
governance of the
economy
-success of broader
economic policy regime
-gradual economic
liberalization
-strong state and
administrative capacity
-strong economic
fundamentals
-experience with state
governance of the
economy
-gradual economic
liberalization
-dynamic capital
management

*Sources: See Section IV.
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cronyism and
corruption
-possibly
hindered
development of
financial sector
-possibly
facilitated
corruption

-possibly
constrained the
development of
the financial
sector
-possibly
encouraged nonperforming loans
-possibily
facilitated
corruption
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